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Preface * T fms BOOK is neither about Islam in general nor about the place of politics in Islamic culture. It is about contemporary Islamist movements-the activist groups who see in Islam as much a political ideology as a religion, and who are therefore breaking with a certain tradition themselves. These are the movements that for several decades, and particularly during the last decade, have mounted challenges against both the West and the regimes in place in the Middle East. Does contemporary political Islam offer an alternative to Muslim societies? This is the subject of the pages that follow.
It strikes me as intellectually imprudent and historically misguided to discuss the relationships between Islam and politics as if 'there were one Islam, timeless and eternal. In saying as much, I diverge as far from the prevailing discourse among Islamic intellectuals as from the mirror vision that still dominates a part of Western Islamic studies, or more precisely what I will refer to here as "Orientalism": the perception of Islam and of Muslim societies as one global, timeless cultural system. Not that I wish to deny fourteen centuries of remarkable permanence in dogma, religious practice, and world vision. But concrete political practices during that time have been numerous and complex, and Muslim societies have been sociologically diverse. We often forget as well that there is a broad range of opinion among Muslim intellectuals as to the correct political and social implications of the Quranic message. Western Orientalists, however, tend either to cut through the debate by deciding | for the Muslims what the Quran means or to accept the point of (view of a particular Islamic school while ignoring all others. To reduce all the problems of the contemporary Muslim world-from the legitimacy of existing states to the integration of immigrant workers-to the residual effects of Islamic culture seems to me tautological, in that by imposing the grid of a culturalist reading upon the modern Middle East, we end up seeing as reality whatever was predetermined by the grid, notably with regard to what I call the "Islamic political imagination," to be found in generic statements such as "In Islam, there is no separation between politics and religion." Of course, this political imagination must be taken seriously, in the sense that it permeates and lends structure to both the leaders' discourse and the subjects' revolt. But it is never directly explanatory and in fact conceals all that is rupture and history: the importation of new types of states, the birth of new social classes, and the advent of contemporary ideologies.
Beginning in the 1930s, Hasan al-Banna, the founder in Egypt 1 of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Abul-Ala Maududi, the creator of the Indo-Pakistani Jamaat-i Islami party, introduced a new move-1 ment of thought that endeavored to define Islam primarily as a political system, in keeping with the major ideologies of the twentieth century. But they brought legitimacy to this new vision by the theme 1 of a "return"-a return to the texts and to the original inspiration of the first community of believers. We will thus be examining the
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• ix historical actuality of a movement that rejects its own historicity. In keeping with the terminology used by others, I will refer to the contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology as "Islamism." Not that Islamism is disappearing from the political scene. On the contrary, from Pakistan to Algeria it is spreading, becoming commonplace, being integrated into politics, leaving its mark on mores j and conflicts. It will probably come to power in Algeria. But it has | lost its original impetus. It has "social-democratized" itself. It no longer offers a model for a different society or a brighter future.
Today, any Islamist political victory in a Muslim country would produce only superficial changes in customs and law. Islamism has been transformed into a type of neofundamentalism concerned solely with reestablishing Muslim law, the sharia, without inventing new political forms, which means that it is condemned to serving as a mere cover for a political logic that eludes it-a logic in which we ultimately find the traditional ethnic, tribal, or communal divisions, ever ready to change their discourse of legitimization, hidden beneath the new social categories and regimes. As for the "Islamic economy," it is mere rhetoric, masking either a form of Third World state socialism (Iran in the era of Khomeini) or an economic liber-/ alism geared more toward speculation than toward production.
Why didn't it succeed? The failure is primarily an intellectual x • Preface one. Islamic thought rests on an initial premise that destroys its own innovative elements: on the one hand, as the logic goes, the existence of an Islamic political society is a necessary condition for the believer to achieve total virtue; but on the other hand, such a society functions only by the virtue of its members, beginning with its leaders.
In short, the development of Islamist thought, which is political par 
M
'ANY IN THE West seem to view the end of our century as the era of the "Islamic threat." The irruption of Islam into the political landscape is often perceived as an anachronism; how is it possible, late in the twentieth century, to return to the Middle Ages? We envision bearded mullahs everywhere, surging forth from mosques and villages to attack the modern-day Babylons, seeking to create a reactionary, irrational, and violent world. Yet history has taught us that barbarity is inherent in cities and has never signaled a return to what came before. It is not that the Middle Ages are invading our modern world, but rather that modernity itself produces its own forms of protest.
In our prevailing outlook we remain prisoners of the old schema of the Enlightenment whereby there is only one form of Progress: as we see it, political modernity, embodied in parliamentary democracy, goes hand in hand with economic development, the easing of moral codes, and secularization. In this respect our memory is short and selective. How many revolutions have been fundamentally puritanical, even profoundly religious, from Cromwell to Robespierre? How much industrial modernization has occurred under dictatorships, from Napoleon III to Mussolini? How many dictatorships have been secular, even antireligious, from Mexico to the Soviet Union?
Islamism as a Third World Movement
The Islamist sphere of influence spans the entire spectrum of activist groups who, in the second half of the twentieth century, see their actions as an extension of the concepts elaborated by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hasan al-Banna (1906 -1949 , Indeed, as much from a sociological as from an intellectual point of view, these movements are products of the modern world.
The militants are rarely mullahs; they are young products of the modern educational system, and those who are university educated tend to be more scientific than literary; they come from recently urbanized families or from the impoverished middle classes. Islamists consider Islam to be as much a religion as an "ideology," a neologism which they introduced and which remains anathema to the ulamas (the clerical scholars). They received their political education not in religious schools but on college and university campuses, where they rubbed shoulders with militant Marxists, whose in terms of a global, timeless system-a mirror effect that no doubt explains both the violence and the sterility of the polemics. The pages that follow will seem at times to accept this presupposition, by the mere fact that we take at their word the arguments of the actors: to which conceptual configuration are they referring when they conceive of Islam as a political system? To what extent does this configuration function in their political action?
The "Orientalist" presupposition consists, among Western specialists or essayists, in defining a timeless "Islamic culture," a conceptual framework that structures both political life and urban architecture, the thought of the ulamas and of their detractors, and whose consequence would be the nonemergence of capitalism (M. Weber) and the absence of an autonomous space for politics and institutions (B. Badie). A timeless civilization in which everything is interrelated and reflects a same structure, from the stucco arabesque to the legal treatise, but a civilization brutally confronted with the challenge of a modernity arisen from outside. According to this view, "Islamic culture" is the major obstacle prohibiting access to political modernity. 3 What is this presupposition of political modernity? We find In comparativism, one is constantly moving between the Islamic corpus (the texts produced by scholars and intellectuals) and the concrete sociological reality: the "lack" of modernity in Muslim countries is explained at times by the effects of the absence of a conceptual category that is present in Western thought (for example, since the concept of a state based on territory is absent from the corpus of Islamic politics, it is impossible to achieve a modern state, which is by definition territorialized); at times by the existence of a sociological category not reflected in the corpus (the patrimonial state, the segmentation into "solidarity groups," asabiyya). 6 The first approach confirms the impossibility of the emergence of an autonomous political authority within the framework of "Islamic culture"; the second, in contrast, highlights the autonomy of the political authority-albeit a premodern political authority (a patrimonial values, is prohibited. Finally, the state is never considered in terms of a territorialized nation-state: the ideal is to have a power that would rule over the entirety of the umma, the community of the faithful, while actual power is exercised over a segment of the umma whose borders are contingent, provisional, and incomplete.
It is thus commonplace to say that in the Islamic political imagination, no distinction is made between the religious and the political orders. This idea is one of the deep convictions of the political actors in contemporary Islam: on the basis of this fact alone, independently of any theological analysis of its validity, it should be taken seriously.
We therefore should study the effect it produces on thought and political practice, and not consider it a necessary fact in the history and the actual political practice of Islam, which would mean an absence of a specifically political authority.
The Debate on the State in Muslim Society
According to the Orientalist perspective, the intellectual configuration described above has been an obstacle to the appearance of a political space and to the emergence of a modern state. This is not and charismatic dictators as the best response to Western duplicity.
The worse legacy of the West was no doubt to offer the Muslim people a ready-to-wear devil: conspiracy theory is currently paralyzing Muslim political thought. For to say that every failure is the devil's work is the same as asking God, or the devil himself (which is to say, these days, the Americans), to solve one's problems. 16 Between the miracle that doesn't happen and the pact in which one loses one's soul, there is plenty of room for discontent.
Among the ulamas, mullahs, and their followers, the historical evolution of the Muslim world has had little effect on the political imagination derived from the paradigm of the "Islamic society," a paradigm that also recurs in Islamist movements. The "Islamic polit- but also the thought of this world, the conceptual framework of Islamist intellectuals. One thing is indeed striking: most Islamists were educated in a "Westernized" environment, yet they hold to the corpus of the ulamas (whom they accuse in passing of having poorly managed this corpus). All their literature insists on the rationality of religious prescriptions; this militant rationalism is a sign that modernity has worked its way into the very heart of Islamist discourse, which is so rationalist that it ends up denying its own religious practices.
But does Islamist discourse truly dominate the Muslim world?
In addressing this question we should consider neither the number of books published nor the opinions of professors or journalists, but the networks through which these works are distributed, and the places and languages in which they are written-in other words, the public that is touched by them. The publication and distribution which is radical in its demand for a fully Islamic society, has always remained within a legal framework, even when its results in elections were laughable; in Afghanistan, it is often difficult to comprehend the ideological differences between the Hizb-i Islami and the Jamaati Islami, although the first has carried out sectarian and quite violent actions, and the second has always proved to be a party of openness.
What is more, the Islamist movements themselves constantly oscillate between political activism and neofundamentalism, that is, between primacy accorded the political struggle and that given to the Islamization of the society. Al-Banna, for one, has at times advocated the rejection of compromise, at times called for collaboration.
Certain things have remained constant, of course, over the last fifty years: the Ayatollah Khomeini has always advocated a radical break (but in language that is at times traditionalist, at times revolu- The revolutionary path was a failure: the Iranian revolution got bogged down in internal struggles and the economic crisis, the activism of the MB dissident groups never managed to achieve a change in regime in an Arab country. The Sunni extremist groups marginalized themselves, the Shiites, on the contrary, became pawns in state strategies (the manipulation of terrorism by Syria and Iran).
But Islamism has profoundly marked the political landscape and contemporary Muslim society. erasing, what differentiated it from traditional fundamentalism. This is why it is important, on a given point, to note the differences
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The essential premise of the Islamist movement is that the political model it proposes presupposes the virtue of individuals, but that this virtue can be acquired only if the society is truly Islamic. All the rest is plot, sin, or illusion.
The vicissitudes that marked the minds of so many during the 1980s have ultimately had little influence on the facts and history:
in the end we find the countries, states, regimes and borders that 
